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Taking Stock of Agent-Principal Challenges in EU structural 
programmes: The Case of the ‘Extended University Programmes’ (PSE) 
in Greece (1997–2006)
Maria Mendrinou and Nikolaos Tzifakis
1. Introduction
The gradual broadening of the EU cohesion’s scope in new policy areas has increased the complexity 
of policy-making at the national level. In this context, the paper seeks to contribute to the enrichment 
of the analytical tools employed for the study of the implementation of EU structural and cohesion 
funds. In particular, it aims to improve our understanding of EU cohesion policy through the utilization 
of the principal-agent model. Our paper focuses on the sub-state part of the EU cohesion policy’s 
contract chain and, more specifically, on a single case study: the ‘Extended University Programmes’ 
(Programmata Spoudon Epilogis, PSE), that were organized to support lifelong higher education 
in Greece. The case selected fulfils a number of aims. First of all, it concerns a policy area that is 
acknowledged for its domestic salience. Emerging issues in educational policy often display a high 
degree of controversiality and appear contentious to the general public. Moreover, education policy is 
governed by multiple stakeholders that constitutionally enjoy wide margins of autonomy and discretion. 
In addition, it is a policy domain under national responsibility that has been increasingly influenced by 
policy areas belonging to the central core of EU competences, such as the internal market. Education 
was introduced into EU cohesion policy objectives at a later stage and has had a legal framework not 
akin to the predominant policy areas of the EU structural and cohesion funds. Last, but not least, the 
main difficulties and strains that were experienced in those programmes’ implementation were not 
mainly related to fraudulent or penal behaviour.
The paper is organized in the following way. The first section presents the dominant analytical device, 
the multi-level governance model, that has been applied so far for the study of EU cohesion policy. The 
paper sketches out the model’s main strengths and deficiencies and argues for a need for its further 
refinement. The second section elaborates on the principal-agent model and briefly analyses the main 
findings from its sporadic employment in the study of cohesion policy. The third section turns to the 
case study suggested to test the utility of the principal-agent model for approaching the main aspects 
of EU cohesion policy: the ‘Extended University Programmes’ (PSE) in Greece. The paper concludes 
with some findings on both the case study per se, and the prospective application of the principal-agent 
model to the area of EU structural policy. 
2. The multilevel governance model
The 1988 reform of EU structural policy triggered a debate in the field of EU studies that culminated 
in the articulation of the multilevel governance model. The focal points in the debate (led by Gary 
Marks and Liesbet Hooghe) were the strengthening of the Commission’s role in cohesion policy and, 
more importantly, the introduction of the partnership principle. The latter previewed the establishment 
of ‘close consultations’ between the Commission, the member states concerned and the respective 
competent national, regional or local authorities in those states for the preparation, implementation 
and assessment of programmes (Council Regulation 2052/88, 12). Gary Marks observed that these 
reforms raised important questions about ‘the distribution of authority and decision-making power across 
the Community, member states, and regional governments’ (1992: 192). In addition, the unmediated 
interaction between the Commission and the regional institutions was perceived to have increased EU 
supranational authority over regional policy, thus challenging the monopoly of state-level institutions 
over intergovernmental relations (Marks, 1992: 221). 
The Maastricht Treaty advanced further the scope of these reforms, indicative of which were the 
founding of the Committee of the Regions, and the multiplication of the channels of direct interaction 
and influence between EU and regional institutions as well as between sub-state institutions of different 
EU members (Hooghe and Marks, 1996). In this respect, the reforms to regional policy were portrayed 
as setting off a ‘centrifugal process’ in which decision-making authorities devolved from the national 
level to both EU institutions upwards and regional institutions downwards (Marks, 1993: 402; Hooghe 
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and Marks, 1996: 91). Thus, Gary Marks observed the emergence of multilevel governance, i.e. ‘a 
system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, 
national, regional, and local – as the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional 
reallocation’ (1993: 392). 
The model’s central tenet that concerns the diminution of the role of state-level institutions in cohesion 
policy has generated some debate. Several analysts have asserted that multilevel governance 
underestimated the gate-keeping role of member states over cohesion policy, whereas others observed 
the gradual renationalization of this field of policy over successive programme periods (see inter alia 
Allen, 2005; Bache, 1999; Pollack, 1995). John Bachtler and Carlos Mendez took the middle ground 
and claimed that the empowerment of supranational institutions and sub-state actors had not taken 
place at the expense of state-level institutions, and thus jurisdiction and authority in EU cohesion 
policy should not be regarded through the prism of a ‘zero-sum game’ (2007: 557). In other words, 
as Simona Piattoni put it, the improvement in the policy-making capabilities of EU and sub-state actors 
would not bring about ‘a redefinition of the institutional or even constitutional set-up of the member-
states’ (2010: 128).
To be fair, the architects of the multilevel governance model soon clarified that they did not deny the 
preeminent role of state-level institutions in EU politics (see Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 346; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 3). They instead argued that central governments have been increasingly 
sharing decision-making competencies with both supranational and sub-state institutions. They also put 
forward the idea that different political arenas (i.e. European, national and regional/ local arenas) were 
so interconnected within the EU that traditional distinctions between domestic and international politics 
were becoming irrelevant (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 346–7; Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 3–4). 
Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe have indeed aspired to present much more than merely an explanation 
of the operation of cohesion policy. Through their conceptual framework, they sought to offer an account 
of EU decision-making (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 2) and an alternative view of EU integration that 
revolves around the idea of the emergence of a ‘multilevel polity’ (Hooghe and Marks, 1996: 74). In 
this regard, the multilevel governance model represented an attempt to offer a breakthrough in the 
traditional debate of EU studies about intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.
The multilevel governance model contributed to the comprehension of the complexity of decision-making 
and policy implementation in the field of cohesion policy. It also highlighted the ‘spatial distinctions’ and 
‘geographical separations’ among a series of interconnected actors, and thus it brought into evidence 
the dispersion of political authority (Stephenson, 2013: 817, 820). The model’s influence has indeed 
radiated into the world of policy-making as it has been demonstrated by the decision of the Committee 
of the Regions to set up a series of ‘ateliers’ on multilevel governance (Committee of the Regions, n.d.; 
Stephenson, 2013: 822). 
Notwithstanding its descriptive strengths, the model also has serious analytical deficiencies and 
limitations. First of all, owing to its preoccupation with the vertical interaction between public authorities 
located at different levels of government, the model fails to account for the role and influence of non-
governmental actors (Faludi, 2012: 200-204). Furthermore, its underlying ‘territorialism’ and ‘Russian 
doll’ approach to governance denote a neglect of the formation of networks along administrative 
boundaries (Faludi, 2012: 204-207). More importantly, the model does not bring to light any causality, 
nor does it have any predictive power (Stephenson, 2013: 818). To the extent that it does not explain 
the relative leverage of each level of public authority, the model gives the impression that it considers 
‘involvement’ as equivalent to ‘governance’ (Blom-Hansen, 2005: 628). The next section attempts to 
apply the principal-agent model to the corpus of knowledge of the multilevel governance model, aiming 
to remedy many of the aforementioned analytical problems. 
3. The principal-agent model
The principal-agent model was developed in the field of organizational economics to analyze intra-firm 
relations. However, owing to its far-reaching analytical potential, it was soon utilized to explicate all 
kinds of contractual relations, that is to say, any relationship in which ‘one party, the principal, considers 
entering into a contractual agreement with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent will 
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subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the principal’ (Moe, 1984: 756). Typical 
examples include employer-employee or client-service provider relationships. A principal may resort to 
the solution of contracting out to an agent for a variety of reasons, such as cost efficiency considerations, 
lack of necessary expertise and so forth (Kassim and Menon, 2003: 123–124). 
The model’s main contribution lies in its ability to explain the two most common problems that principals 
may encounter in this type of relationships. The first is adverse selection: a principal cannot know with 
certitude the genuine preferences (and capabilities) of candidate agents whose opportunity costs are 
definitely lower than the compensation offered. The second is moral hazard: a contracted agent may 
eventually not advance the principal’s interests with the utmost efficiency. Both of these problems are 
related, on the one hand, to the misalignment of interests between the principal and the agent, and, 
on the other, to the disadvantageous position of the principal vis-à-vis the agent in terms of knowledge 
and information about the agent’s true preferences and actions (the so-called ‘information asymmetry’). 
The model, apart from its ability to diagnose the cause of inefficiencies in contracted actions, is able 
to prescribe solutions to the adverse selection/moral hazard problems. In a nutshell, principals are 
prompted to decide carefully with regard to the following considerations: which types of actions/services 
may be contracted out; how agents are selected; how the contract agreement can shape the agent’s 
incentive structure (and deter agent shirking); and last but not least, how contract monitoring can be 
efficient (Moe, 1984: 759; Blom-Hansen, 2005: 629).  
The model has also gained some currency in the study of relationships that do not have a purely 
economic transactional component per se. For instance, Terry Moe observed the formation of a chain 
of principal-agent relationships in democracies, starting from the citizens, the ultimate principals, going 
next to elected politicians, who have the dual role of being simultaneously the people’s agents and the 
principals of state bureaucracy, and so forth all the way down to the agents delivering services directly 
to the citizens (1984: 761–766). Similarly, in the field of development studies, several analysts have 
remarked on the existence of a long chain of principals and agents commencing from the taxpayers 
in donor countries and ending with the beneficiaries in aid-recipient countries (Bartlett, 2013: 334; 
Araral, 2009: 854–856). Interestingly, neither principals nor agents are necessarily single unitary 
actors. For instance, interest groups and state agencies may compete with elected politicians to exert 
influence on the work of bureaucracy (Waterman and Meier, 1998: 179). And different agents within 
state agencies may compete at the stage of policy implementation (Waterman and Meier, 1998: 181). 
Therefore, the longer and more complicated the chain of principals and agents, the greater will be the 
possibility that interests might be misaligned at some intermediate points of principal-agent interaction, 
rendering highly improbable the efficient accomplishment of the ultimate principals’ original objective(s) 
(Bartlett, 2013: 346).   
The principal-agent model represents a valuable addition to the multilevel governance model. It builds 
on the latter’s main premise about the fragmentation of decision-making and policy implementation 
across different levels, while it simultaneously moves forward the debate to explicate the distribution of 
power and configuration of interests among all the actors involved. Moreover, the principal-agent model 
adds flexibility to the multilevel governance analytical framework by generating the space necessary 
for the study of the role in policy making of multiple non-governmental actors ranging from private 
corporations and pressure groups to individuals. As a result, the principal-agent model is appropriate 
to analyze complex inter-institutional arrangements and exchanges, such as those pertaining to the 
operation of the European Union (Kassim and Menon, 2003: 125). 
Over recent years, one might have noticed a steady growth in the EU studies literature that has 
employed the principal-agent model to account for the operation of different European organs, such 
as the European Commission (Pollack, 1997), the European Central Bank (Elgie, 2002), the European 
Environment Agency (Zito, 2009) and the European External Action Service (Henökl, 2014). The model 
has also been applied to the study of different EU policy areas, such as foreign economic policy (Dür 
and Elsig, 2011), employment policy (de la Porte, 2011), foreign development assistance (Bartlett, 
2013) and migration policy (Menz, 2014). Nonetheless, the principal-agent model has not dominated 
analyses of EU cohesion policy where the crux of the matter is the study of contractual relations. 
Strangely, there are very few theoretical or empirical applications from a principal-agent perspective. 
Yet, most of these studies have yielded some very interesting findings. 
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In particular, Jens Blom-Hansen (2005) used the model to investigate the European Commission’s 
ability to control member states in the field of EU cohesion policy. The analyst demonstrated that the 
Commission cannot remedy the adverse selection problem since member states are by definition its 
agents (Blom-Hansen, 2005: 630). Furthermore, the Commission does not have sufficient powers 
to prevent the appearance of the moral hazard problem either. Under EU cohesion policy, member 
states have a very broad mandate consisting of non-binding and hard to verify principles, such as 
additionality and innovation (Blom-Hansen, 2005: 631-633). More importantly, whereas the EU has set 
up several monitoring mechanisms (such as national monitoring committees, ex-ante, mid-term and 
ex-post evaluations and reports, and investigations by the European Court of Auditors), the European 
Commission is in a weak position to sanction non-criminal agent drift (Blom-Hansen, 2005: 634–637). 
Likewise, Michael Bauer has highlighted the dual role of the Commission in the area of cohesion policy, 
being simultaneously the agent of the Council, the European Court of Auditors and the European 
Parliament, and also the principal/supervisor of member-state policy implementation (2006: 723–731). 
The study by John Bachtler and Martin Ferry (2013) assessed the impact of the quantitative conditionalities 
that were introduced in the 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 programming periods with the aim of improving 
member-state compliance with cohesion policy goals. The two analysts found that the Commission’s 
attempt to mould the incentive structure of member states had had mixed results. EU members 
had complied very well with the ‘decommitment rule’ (previewing that payments for projects should 
be completed within two years of the year of commitment), and thus the absorption of structural 
funds improved spectacularly (Bachtler and Ferry, 2013: 5-7). However, many EU countries have 
applied the ‘performance reserve’, which stipulates the reallocation of funds within member states from 
underperforming programmes to the most successful ones, inconsistently. Moreover, some EU members 
have managed to add flexibility to the implementation of the ‘earmarking principle’ introduced in the 
2007-2013 period with the intention of increasing the share of funds directed to the stimulation of 
growth and employment (Bachtler and Ferry, 2013: 7–11). John Bachtler and Martin Ferry explicated 
the variations in the degree of compliance of member states with these conditionalities by making 
reference to the distribution of interests among EU institutions and member states (2013: 12–13).
What most studies of EU cohesion policy from a principal-agent perspective have in common is an 
almost exclusive preoccupation with the interaction between the Commission and member states. 
Strangely, it seems that there is very little research interest in other parts on the EU cohesion policy 
contract chain. A notable exception is the study by Károly Mike and Gábor Balás (2014) that examined 
how states, as principals, select their agents to implement EU-funded programmes. The two authors 
argue that the choice is usually between establishing new single-purpose managing authorities (and 
intermediate bodies) at different levels and parts of their national/regional bureaucracies on the 
one hand, and relying on existing organizations within their national/regional administration, on the 
other. Whereas the former choice reflects a preoccupation with compliance with EU rules and financial 
absorption, the latter might signify a concern with policy efficiency (Mike and Balás, 2014: 25–27). 
This is because good performance in terms of meeting measurable short-term indicators in EU-funded 
programmes does not necessarily imply an incremental genuine advancement in (frequently hard-to-
quantify) medium-term national policy objectives (Mike and Balás, 2014: 17–23). To be sure, states have 
usually adopted ‘hybrid’ solutions that combine elements from both of the aforementioned ‘ideal types’ 
of solutions. Still, their overall inclination towards either end of the continuum (i.e. new single-purpose 
structures and existing agencies) seems to indicate a hierarchical prioritization between the objectives 
of financial absorption and policy efficiency (Mike and Balás, 2014: 25–27). The tension between these 
objectives is further noticed in the way states designate contracts, or more precisely, whether they rely 
on ordinarily-used procurement/contracting solutions or opt for an overt projectification of EU-funded 
programmes (Mike and Balás, 2014: 28–30). Therefore, several decisions by states as principals for 
the national implementation of EU cohesion policy are telling of the extent to which EU goals and 
assessment indicators are aligned well to national priorities and procedures.
Having briefly discussed the principal-agent model and some findings from its application in EU 
cohesion policy, the next section turns to our case study, the ‘Extended University Programmes’ (PSE) 
in Greece. It presents the content of these programmes and it accounts for some of the hurdles in 
their implementation. By bringing to the surface divergent sub-national interests with respect to those 
programmes’ operation, we attempt to make a contribution to the comprehension of additional aspects 
of the EU cohesion policy contract chain. 
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4. The ‘Extended University Programmes’ in Greece
In the Second Community Support Framework (CSF, 1994–99), the Greek government introduced a 
programme called the ‘Operational Programme for Education and Early Vocational Training’.1 The Greek 
government took advantage of the expanding scope of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds to other 
policy fields (Council Regulations 2083/93 and 2084/93) to advance aspects of Greek educational policy 
that lagged behind in a number of areas, such as research, graduate studies and lifelong learning. 
The decision was consistent not only with developments in EU structural and cohesion policy, but 
also with the general EU directions that prompted the advancement of cooperation in the policy area 
of education.2 By enhancing the scope of the cohesion programmes to include policy fields like that 
of higher education, it was anticipated that new structures and services would be developed, while 
those already in place would be reformed to encompass the new needs. More importantly, Greece was 
a latecomer to and an underachiever in the targets set for widening the access to lifelong learning 
compared to the EU as a whole (Figure 1). The situation has been much more pronounced in the case 
of tertiary education (Figure 2), in part as a result of the General Entry Examination system applied, 
and in part due to the relatively early, yet binding choice, that young people have to make regarding 
their prospective field of studies.
1For the Structural and Cohesion Funds of the period 1994–1999, Greece was identified as an Objective 1 case since economic 
development in the country was lagging well behind the EU average. The total allocations for Greece were 13,980 million ECUs 
at 1994 prices, of which around 9% was earmarked for Community initiatives (see European Commission, 1996). 
2The Treaty of Maastricht for the first time explicitly introduced a widening of the cooperation options among EU member states, 
involving also the area of education (see Arts. 3p and 126, TEC). It was a pivotal development that paved the way for the 
introduction of new modes of EU governance such as the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC). It should be noted that from 
the 1990s onwards, the developments between European countries that set in motion the formation of the European Higher 
Education Area (EHEA) by 2010 had been considerable. From then on, the ‘complementary’, according to the Lisbon Treaty 
(Art. 6, TFEU), policy areas in the EU kept evolving. Ruled by soft law and targets set by member states, coordination under 
the mode of the OMC has since contributed to advancing EU cooperation in policy areas well beyond those of the Treaties’ core. 
Figure 1: The Greek case on the participation rate in education and training (last four weeks) for the 
age group 25-64 (in percentage) in comparative perspective.
 
Source: Compiled from the Eurostat. 
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3 In Greece, higher education is public and provided by the universities and technological educational institutes. Although there is 
no provision for private tertiary education, since the late 1980s, a number of private providers under a franchising arrangement 
with universities abroad (mainly British and American) have been active in Greece offering tertiary education. They have been 
covered by the ‘freedom to provide services’ and are supervised by the Ministry of Commerce rather than that of Education. 
Figure 2: The Greek case on the participation rate in tertiary education and training for the age group 
25-64 (in percentage) in comparative perspective.
Source: Compiled from the Eurostat. 
It was in this context that the ‘Extended University Programmes’ were introduced in 1997 (Law 
2525/1997 and Ministerial Decision 6495/1997). The programmes were organized by Greek universities 
and technological educational institutes3 through a process of competitive bidding for funding from the 
European Regional Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) that was administered by the Greek 
Ministry of Education. The approval for programmes was conditional on both their compatibility with 
the aims set by the government and on their long-term feasibility and sustainability. The programmes’ 
main aim was the establishment of a structure for lifelong learning in higher education that would, 
in a way, supplement the Hellenic Open University for Distance Advanced Learning, founded in 1992. 
The programmes offered higher and continued education in the context of lifelong learning to all 
qualified graduates of secondary education in new and interdisciplinary fields. The enrolled students 
could either get a higher education degree upon successful completion of the full academic curriculum 
(whose duration exceeded the four-year cycle of regular university degree programmes) or receive a 
certificate of attendance for selected courses. Enrolment was competitive and based on criteria set by 
law and the number of places available. Although the enrolment process was different from that for the 
General Entry Examinations, it took into consideration the applicants’ performance in exams in all cases, 
except for two categories. The first concerned those who were already holders of a university degree, 
and second was the case of those who had not taken exams but had a certified secondary degree; in 
total these two categories accounted for 20 per cent of the available places. The legal framework was 
particularly thorough regarding eligibility criteria and categories (Art. 4, para. 5, Ministerial Decision 
6495/1997) and was further explicated by the legal framework of each individual programme (see inter 
alia Art. 2 para. 9, Ministerial Decision B1/580/1998).
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Table 1: Criteria and quotas by category for enrollment in the Programs according to Ministerial Decision 
6495/1997
Categories  
of Enrolment
Secondary  
Education – 
Entry  
Examination
Students in 
Universities 
Abroad
Students in 
Greek Higher 
Education
University 
Graduates
Others –  
Secondary 
Education –  
No Entry  
Examination
Categories I II III IV V
Quotas 45% 20% 15% 10% 10%
General Grade 
in Secondary 
Education
√ √ √ √
Average Grade 
in General Entry 
Examinations
√ √ √
Years of  
Unemployment √ √ √
Years of  
Employment √ √ √
Years of  
Post-secondary 
Education
√ √
Number of 
Courses Com-
pleted in Higher 
Education
√ √
Average Grade 
in Higher  
Education
√
Grade in Higher 
Education √
Shortly afterwards, the legal framework of the PSE was contested in court (Council of State) and found 
to be unconstitutional in several respects. In a nutshell, it was considered to violate the principle of 
equality as admission to a PSE was not linked to successful participation in the General Entry Exams; 
it erroneously put universities and technological educational institutes on an equal footing; and it was 
established by a ministerial decision instead of a presidential decree (see Panaretos, 1999 for a brief 
discussion of the Council of State’s Decision 2820/1999). Furthermore, many opponents and critics of the 
programmes argued that the introduction of tuition fees for all students aged over 25 years represented 
an additional violation of the constitutional provision for free-of-charge higher education. Following the 
court’s (Council of State) ruling, the Ministry of Education enacted a new law in parliament that strove 
to remedy most of the problems (Law 2752/1999). For instance, the programmes’ reformed legal 
framework emphasized that their objective was to provide lifelong learning education (as opposed to 
conventional education), and thus it stipulated that the PSE should prioritize the admission of students 
aged over 23 years (Art. 1, para. 9). The Council of State ruled that the new law attempted to annul 
the court’s previous decision and pronounced the programmes’ new legal framework unconstitutional 
too (Decision 2581/2000; see also Contiades, 2001). As a result, the PSEs suspended the enrolment of 
new students and continued their operation only with respect to students already registered so that the 
latter could complete their studies. In mid-2005, the Ministry of Education announced the termination 
of the PSE at the end of the academic year 2005/6 (Art. 11, para. 2, Law 3369/2005). 
Following the court’s second ruling, the Ministry of Education addressed the demand for lifelong 
learning by directing its efforts towards distance-learning providers that were quite different from 
the conventional higher education programmes. In particular, the Hellenic Open University is in the 
mainstream in Greek higher education for those aged over 25 years who wish to enrol for a university 
degree, whereas the Centres for Continued Education and Training, that were developed in the context 
of the Second ‘Operational Programme for Education and Early Vocational Training’ (2000–2006), offer 
a great variety of e-learning programmes. Furthermore, in 2005, the Ministry of Education offered the 
67
universities and technological educational institutes the possibility of creating an additional structure, 
i.e. Institutes of Lifelong Learning (Art. 9, Law 3369/2005). Thus, the demand for studies in extended 
university programmes has been channelled into other competing structures similarly funded by the 
ERDF, the ESF and Greek national resources in accordance with the CSF’s rules. 
It is certain that the decision of the Greek government to promote lifelong learning as part of its 
educational policy was reasonable and in agreement with the aims of EU cohesion policy. Indicative is 
the number of applications received by the PSE of the University of Athens that was organized by four 
university departments and the National School of Public Administration. The programme in its first 
offer of 250 places received 4,060 applications. The demand4 came mainly from graduates of secondary 
education, yet a considerable number of those wished to enrol for a second university degree (Table 2).
Table 2: Number of applications by call for the PSE organized in the National and Kapodistrian University 
of Athens and rate of enrollment by category of beneficiaries
1998 1999 2000
No of Applications Quota 4060 3202 3022
Secondary Educa-
tion – Entry Ex-
amination
45% 1:19,48 1:13,25 1:10,99
Students in Uni-
versities Abroad 20% 1:1,24 1:1,00 1:7,50
Students in Greek 
Higher Education 15% 1:2,47 1:1,58 1:10,82
University Gradu-
ates 10% 1:23,15 1:19,48 1:11,04
Others – Second-
ary Education – No 
Entry Examination
10% 1:40,04 1:33,86 1:11,13
Total 100% 1:15,92 1:12,46 1:10,99
Table 3: Number of PSE organized, number of participating Departments, and distribution of Programs 
between Universities and Technological Educational Institutes
Area of Study No of PSE No of Universi-ties (HEI)
No of Techno-
logical Institutes 
(TEI)
No of Depart-
ments
Humanities 7 13 (2 from abroad)
14 & 1 group of 
academics
Sciences 4 5 6
Economics -  
Administration
6
(2 HEI & 4 TEI) 2 (NSPA)
5 
(1 from abroad) 14
Technology 9 (2 HEI & 7 TEI) 2 7
18 & 3 groups  
of academics
Environment 6 (3 HEI & 3 TEI)
7 
(4 from abroad) 5
16 & 1 group  
of academics
TOTAL 32(18 HEI & 14 TEI)
29 
(6 from abroad)
17
(1 from abroad)
68 & 5 groups 
of academics
4It is estimated that around 75 per cent of the applications received by the University of Athens are in categories I and V, see 
Table 1.
Source: The PSE on Human Resource Management and Administration, University of Athens, Evaluation Report, 
1998-2000, unpublished report.
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There was similar demand for other PSE. As Table 3 shows, 32 programmes were established, 18 in 
universities and 14 in technological educational institutes. Most of the programmes were interdisciplinary 
and tended to involve several partners, such as academic departments (within universities and 
technological institutes, or involving various higher education institutions in Greece and abroad), other 
organizations and groups of teaching staff. In all cases, the studies offered by the programmes had 
to be innovative and not on offer by other higher education institutions in Greece. There was also a 
considerable regional distribution of the programmes to cover almost all Greek regions (see Table 4). 
In the first year of their operation (1998), more than 3,500 students were enrolled, while the number 
of interested applicants was considerably higher. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, the programmes 
failed to take root as new structures in Greek higher education and managed to complete their task 
solely in relation to students (end beneficiaries) who successfully completed their studies and graduated 
up until 2006.5
Table 4: Regional Distribution of the PSE
No of Programs City in which the Program  was located Regions
3 Athens
Attica
3 Piraeus
7 Thessaloniki Central Macedonia
3 Chania
Crete
4 Heraklion
3 Ioannina Epirus
3 Volos Thessaly
1 Mytilene North Aegean
1 Patras Western Greece
1 Kavala East Macedonia & Thrace
2 Kozani West Macedonia
1 Kalamata Peloponnese
32 12 10 of 13
The principal-agent model appears to be particularly valuable in explicating the initial success and rapid 
demise of the PSE in the context of EU structural and cohesion funds in Greece.
The Ministry of Education, the main principal at the national level, apart from participating (along with 
EU authorities) in the shaping of the relevant legal framework, delegated the implementation of the 
programmes to the main national agents eligible to do so, the universities and technical education 
institutes. Although the introduction of a new programme in Greek higher education appeared to be 
a straightforward undertaking particularly since, in the Greek case, the choice of main agents was 
actually restricted to public higher education institutions, the ensuing complexities of implementing 
these EU cohesion programmes were uncompromising, leading just a few years after their introduction 
to their suspension. 
However, the ‘moral hazard’ and ‘adverse selection’ concerns remain valid in the case under examination 
since the establishment of a PSE was decided by a competitive process of open calls. The 32 programmes 
approved were just a portion of the tenders submitted by the various universities and technological 
institutes. Whereas the overwhelming majority of the PSE ran smoothly, the most serious troubles 
emerged in just one higher education institution, the Polytechnic of Crete, where faculty members and 
students on conventional programmes were mobilized against the establishment of three programmes 
and twice made recourse to the Council of State (Rouggeri, 1998). Interestingly, it was also at the 
5The abrupt decision by the Ministry of Education in 2005 to terminate the programmes by the of the end of the next academic 
year implied that, for a very small number of courses, a group of students did not receive their degrees having failed to be 
successfully examined (in some cases they had even submitted their final dissertations) (EEO Group, 2009: 185).
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Polytechnic of Crete that the university authorities were accused and found guilty of having been 
involved in very serious irregularities (Rouggeri, 1998; Kathimerini, 2004). Hence, the question of the 
operation of the three PSE at the Polytechnic of Crete put to the test the main concerns that have been 
advanced by the principal-agent model. 
Moreover, the employment of the principal-agent model in the case of the PSE brings to the surface 
the existence of contradictory dynamics: one linked to the constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy and 
discretion that Greek higher education institutions enjoy, and another related to the ‘vertical integration’ 
(see inter alia Klein et al. 1978; Arrow 1975; Grossman and Hart 1986; Eisenhardt 1989) in the 
principal-agent relationship that binds the agent to compliance with the principal’s terms in a hierarchical 
manner. It was indeed this aspect that contributed crucially to the failure of the programmes since 
any miscalculation by the principal impacted critically on the agent’s compliance (e.g. the enrolment 
of students under 23 years old). 
The complexity and, in a way, the novelty that the case of the PSE adds to the application of the principal-
agent model in EU cohesion policy is related to the identification of a long array of agents, notably some 
‘mixed’ (consisting of both beneficiaries/supporters and opponents), alongside competing agents. The 
struggle between beneficiaries and opponents, as the case of the PSE displays, shows that it may have 
a devastating impact on implementing the prospects for an EU structural/cohesion programme. Figure 
3 offers a schematic graphical representation of the principal-agent model for the case of the PSE.
The ministry in its initial choice in shaping the programmes faced two ‘competing principals’: the political 
opposition that criticized aspects of the programmes’ legal framework and the Council of State6 that 
had the responsibility to review conformity with the constitution of administrative actions. Although 
part of the political opposition (the Communist Party of Greece, KKE) was particularly keen to bring 
to an end the programmes, even after their adoption by Parliament (see for instance Rizospastis, 
1999b), this was eventually achieved though court rulings, following actions brought by opponents of 
the programmes. As a result, the government decided to adjust the main implementing agents, either 
by boosting the role of already existing competing agents, such as the Hellenic Open University, or by 
forming new ones, such as the Centres for Continued Education and Training. The latter incorporated 
both the main implementing agents of the programmes, higher education institutions, and on demand 
and according to expertise, other actors such as professional chambers. 
6For a consideration of courts as competing principals, see Waterman, Wright and Rouse (1994), quoted in Waterman and 
Meier, 1998: 179.
Figure 3: Graphical representation from the Principal-Agent perspective of the case of the PSE
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While the PSE responded to an actual need for higher education lifelong learning, they also caused some 
concern to several agents and groups of actors. First of all, many students on conventional university 
programmes perceived the PSE as a threat and an injustice that jeopardized their career prospects and 
discredited their successful performance in the demanding and rather tedious process of the General 
Entry Examinations. Likewise, some professional chambers (e.g. the Chamber of Fine Arts of Greece) 
expressed their opposition to the programmes out of concern for the career opportunities of their 
members (Rouggeri, 1998; Rizospastis 1998 and 1999a).
From the case study we also discern a number of ‘mixed’ agents that contributed in a critical manner to 
the ‘disjointed’ implementation of the PSE. The two most prominent ‘mixed agents’ were the following: 
local authorities and societies, and academic personnel/faculty members. 
The local authorities and societies constituted such a type of agent, since along with opposing approaches, 
they more often than not tended to support the decentralization of higher education in Greece. The 
regional distribution of the programmes (see Table 4) prompted a diverse stance on the matter that often 
triggered internal disputes in local societies. To illustrate, whereas the City Council of Chania pronounced 
its unanimous support for the continued operation of the three programmes at the Polytechnic of Crete 
(Rizospastis, 1999b), the Chania Bar Association sued the university’s authorities in court, accusing 
them of being involved in several irregularities when setting up these programmes (Moulopoulos, 1998). 
The academic personnel/faculty members were the other ‘mixed agent’ that the case study discerned. 
Teaching and supervision of the programmes were exclusively undertaken by academic personnel, 
either already employed by the university or having similar academic qualifications. The case of this 
‘mixed’ agent was particularly complicated since faculty members are also involved in the administration 
of Greek higher education institutions. The decision to organize a PSE presupposed approval by the 
university organs in which the faculty members participated by law. At the same time, a considerable 
number of faculty members viewed the programmes: as structures competing with conventional 
departments; as a potential threat to the public character of higher education in Greece since the 
programs provided for fees for those over 25 years of age; and as a mean to increase the flexibility 
of university structures. A peculiarity and complexity of this ‘mixed’ agent was that, contrary to the 
external challenge of other adversaries, in this case controversy was internalized by the main agents, 
too. Thus, controversy regarding the programmes escalated the tension around their implementation 
within the everyday functioning of higher education institutions (Rouggeri, 1998). 
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has tested the hypothesis of the analytical quality of the principal-agent model for investigating 
the complexities of the implementation of EU cohesion policy programmes at the national level. It has 
used as case study the PSE in Greece and demonstrated the model’s analytical utility for empirical 
investigations of the sub-state part of the chain of policy-making actors. The paper argues that the 
actual failure of the PSE (and consequently of EU cohesion policy) to form a structure of lifelong learning 
in Greek higher education was not causally linked to any fraudulent or penal behaviour. It was instead 
the result of multiple misalignments of objectives of actors located at different parts of the contract 
chain, all the way down from the Commission to the final agents on the ground. In this respect, the 
case study presents the interplay among the main actors and stakeholders who stood in favour or in 
opposition to the operation of the PSE and elaborates some types of conflicts of interest that obstructed 
policy implementation. 
The paper also remarks that, on occasion, the ‘moral hazard’ concern in the principal-agent model 
may be reversed, as well. In particular, as the investigation of the PSE shows, it was the poor design of 
programmes, with several unconstitutional provisions (e.g. principle of equal access to higher education) 
and the neglect of beneficiaries, that seriously compromised the effectiveness of EU cohesion funds. 
Notwithstanding that their legal framework has been challenged since 2000, the PSE kept running 
(without, though, new student enrolments) until 2006. Eventually, of the 6,000 students who enrolled 
on the PSE, many did not receive a degree as they failed to complete their studies in timely fashion, 
while the qualifications of some categories of graduates have yet to be certified (EEO Group, 2009: 
185, 193 and 194).
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The fact that the closure of the programmes coincided with the end of the third CSF (2000–2006) leads 
us to the assumption that the Ministry of Education prioritized quantifiable results within the CSF’s 
timeframe (absorption of funds) rather than a genuine widening of access to higher education (policy 
efficiency). Indeed, Greece managed to absorb 94 per cent of the cohesion funds for lifelong learning 
of the Second ‘Operational Program for Education and Early Vocational Training’ up until the end of 
2008 (EEO Group, 2009: 172). However, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, Greece has not succeeded 
equally in improving the participation rate of its people aged 25–64 years old in training and education. 
To conclude, our case study demonstrates that the potential of the principal-agent model to explicate 
the complexity of EU cohesion policy has been underexplored thus far. 
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